Toward a Centralized Hatch-Waxman Venue
Matthew Makowski†
Pharmaceutical litigation often begins when a generic drug company files an
application to have its generic drug approved by the FDA. That application is received by the FDA in the District of Maryland. To “submit” it is a statutory act of
patent infringement under the Hatch-Waxman Act. Establishing venue in subsequent Hatch-Waxman litigation can be complex because HatchWaxman litigation often involves simultaneous and independent lawsuits against
many generic applicants. A Hatch-Waxman plaintiff might reasonably attempt to
consolidate litigation in a single district court; Hatch-Waxman defendants might
reasonably resist consolidation in the plaintiff’s preferred venue. Recent Supreme
Court and Federal Circuit case law has narrowed venue options for Hatch-Waxman
plaintiffs. This Comment argues for an interpretation of Hatch-Waxman’s statutory
act of patent infringement and the patent venue rules that moves toward a centralized venue for Hatch-Waxman litigation in the District of Maryland.
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INTRODUCTION
The Hatch-Waxman Act1 strikes a sensitive balance in the
pharmaceutical market. “Pioneer” pharmaceutical companies
bear the immense cost of developing new drug products approved
by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). As a result, these
pioneers typically protect their valuable drug products with numerous patents. Other “generic” pharmaceutical companies can
later enter markets created by pioneers, offering competing
generic drug products and driving down prices for patients.
Hatch-Waxman creates a statutory scheme that enables patent
infringement litigation between pioneers and generic drug companies in advance of the market release of a generic drug.2 HatchWaxman’s rules for patent infringement litigation create unique
procedural hurdles for pioneer plaintiffs attempting to establish
proper venue at the start of litigation. To facilitate litigation
before the actual sale of a generic drug, Hatch-Waxman requires
generic companies to submit an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA)3 for approval by the FDA4 and permits pioneer companies to sue them for a “highly artificial act of [patent]
infringement”5 that consists of that submission.6 Venue in Hatch1 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15,
21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.).
2
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)–(4).
3
See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 678 (1990) (“That is what is
achieved by § 271(e)(2)—the creation of a highly artificial act of infringement that consists
of submitting an ANDA or a paper NDA.”). See generally 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (containing
many of Hatch-Waxman’s substantive provisions governing ANDAs).
4
See Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 678.
5
Id. at 678 (emphasis added); see also Valeant Pharms. N. Am. LLC v. Mylan
Pharms. Inc., 978 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (collecting cases).
6
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2).
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Waxman litigation, in turn, can be established where a generic
ANDA applicant’s “acts of infringement” occur7—i.e. where the
generic applicant has submitted their ANDA.8
But in 2017, the Supreme Court’s decision in TC Heartland
LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC9 brought about substantial changes to patent venue law.10 Then, in Valeant
Pharmaceuticals North America LLC v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals
Inc.11 the Federal Circuit specifically addressed the question of
venue in Hatch-Waxman patent infringement cases, holding that
an ANDA submission occurs “for venue purposes only in districts
where actions related to the submission of an [ANDA] occur.”12
The Federal Circuit, however, expressly did “not define what all
relevant acts involved in the preparation and submission of an
ANDA might be, leaving those questions for other cases where the
precise contours are presented and briefed.”13 By doing so, the
Federal Circuit retained the ability to narrow or broaden the patent venue rules for Hatch-Waxman litigants in response to new
arguments or venue trends post-Valeant.
The Federal Circuit intriguingly suggested, however, that the
ANDA submission always occurs in the District of Maryland—the
site where the FDA receives ANDAs.14 By this reasoning, a generic ANDA applicant, through the act of submitting an ANDA to
the FDA in Maryland, would always commit an act of infringement in the District of Maryland. Thus, the District of Maryland
would always satisfy the acts of infringement requirement of the
patent venue statute for purposes of establishing venue. This
interpretation of the patent venue rules would make it meaningfully easier for all Hatch-Waxman plaintiffs to establish venue in
Maryland and would move toward a centralized venue for HatchWaxman litigation.
Because Hatch-Waxman litigation is often extremely complex, the “precise contours”15 of the patent venue rules can have
7

28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2).
9
137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017).
10 See Valeant, 978 F.3d at 1375 (“In [TC Heartland], the Supreme Court dramatically changed the venue landscape in patent cases.”). See generally, e.g., TC Heartland,
137 S. Ct. 1514.
11 978 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
12 Id. at 1375.
13 Id. at 1384 n.8.
14 See id. (“While it may well be that the District of Maryland satisfies the test for
venue that we have laid out here, we do not resolve that question.”).
15 Id.
8
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significant financial, organizational, and efficiency-related consequences for Hatch-Waxman litigants. Pioneers frequently confront a situation “in which there are multiple ANDA filers but
they do not all reside in the same district.”16 In Valeant, for instance, the plaintiff Valeant filed separate and essentially simultaneous lawsuits against no fewer than twenty-five generic
ANDA applicants in the District of New Jersey17—with accompanying protective suits in at least three other district courts18 as
well, including against Mylan, the defendant on appeal, in the
Northern District of West Virginia.19
If the patent venue rules do not allow a Hatch-Waxman
plaintiff to consolidate multiple lawsuits in a centralized venue,
the pioneer “will be required to file and maintain largely identical
suits in multiple districts,” thus increasing “the time and expense
that is required to resolve these cases on the merits” and potentially resulting “in inconsistent judgments.”20 Yet, allowing a
Hatch-Waxman plaintiff to hale all defendants into any district
court could violate a central tenet of venue policy: litigation
should ideally be limited to districts “that are fair and reasonably
convenient” to the defendant.21
This Comment argues for an interpretation of the patent
venue rules that establishes a single centralized venue for HatchWaxman litigation in the District of Maryland. A centralized
Hatch-Waxman venue is a legally sound result that would facilitate more efficient resolution of Hatch-Waxman litigation. This
Comment proceeds in three parts: First, Part I reviews Hatch-

16 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., C.A. No. CV 17-379-LPS, 2017
WL 3980155, at *12 n.17 (D. Del. Sept. 11, 2017).
17 Cf. Valeant, 978 F.3d at 1377 n.3 (summarizing Valeant’s Hatch-Waxman filings
in the District of New Jersey). See generally, e.g., Order Consolidating Cases for All
Purposes, Valeant Pharms. N. Am. LLC v. Strides Pharma Inc., No. 3:19-cv-00133 (D.N.J.
Jan. 4, 2019), ECF No. 10 (listing the different cases ultimately consolidated in the District
of New Jersey).
18 See Valeant, 978 F.3d at 1377 (describing a protective suit against Mylan filed in
the Northern District of West Virginia); Complaint for Patent Infringement, Valeant
Pharms. N. Am. LLC v. KVK-Tech, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-04195-PD at 2 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 27,
2018), ECF No. 1 (initiating a protective suit against KVK-Tech, Inc. in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania); Complaint for Patent Infringement, Valeant Pharms. N. Am.
LLC v. Par Pharms., Inc., No. 1:18-cv-08221-LLS at 2 (S.D.N.Y Sep. 10, 2018), ECF No. 1
(initiating a protective suit against Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. in the Southern District of
New York).
19 See Valeant, 978 F.3d at 1377.
20 Bristol-Myers Squibb, 2017 WL 3980155, at *12 n.17.
21 32A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 1082 (2022) (citing KM Enter., Inc. v. Glob.
Traffic Techs., Inc., 725 F.3d 718, 724 (7th Cir. 2013)).
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Waxman’s regulatory scheme and the rules for Hatch-Waxman
litigation. Part II evaluates the recent Supreme Court and
Federal Circuit case law that has substantially restructured the
patent venue rules for Hatch-Waxman litigants. Finally, Part III
provides a number of legal and policy arguments supporting a
move toward a centralized Hatch-Waxman venue in the District
of Maryland.
I. HATCH-WAXMAN ACT LITIGATION
The Hatch-Waxman statutory scheme is unique even in the
patent infringement context. Part I.A describes how HatchWaxman structures the drug approval process to incentivize
generic applicants to initiate premarket patent infringement litigation with pioneers. Part I.B then provides an overview of
Hatch-Waxman patent infringement litigation.
A. Regulation of Pioneer and Generic Drug Product Approval
The FDA regulates the marketing and sale of drug products;
without FDA approval, a drug company cannot market or sell its
products in interstate commerce.22 To secure FDA approval of a
new drug product, pioneers must “submit lengthy preclinical and
clinical data demonstrating the drug’s safety and efficacy to [the]
FDA” in the form of a “New Drug Application” (NDA).23 Securing
FDA approval to market and sell a new drug product is a lengthy
and enormously expensive process.24
Instead of incurring the significant costs and risks associated
with new drug product development, generic applicants enter an
existing drug product market created by an FDA-approved pioneer. By definition, a generic drug product is either “the same as
a so-called ‘pioneer drug’ previously approved”25 or only “differs

22 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (“No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into
interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application . . . is effective
with respect to such drug.”).
23 Colleen Kelly, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The HatchWaxman Act, the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 417, 417 (2011).
More generally, this piece offers an excellent overview of the background and core provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act.
24 Id. at 422 (stating that development of a new drug takes “some 15 years” and “costs
in excess of $1.5 billion” (quoting PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL & LEWIS A.
GROSSMAN, FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 764 n.16 (3d ed. 2007))).
25 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 676 (1990) (citing 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(2)(A)).
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from the pioneer drug in specified ways.”26 Thus, a generic drug
company seeking FDA approval for its generic drug is in a fundamentally different position than the pioneer applicant. When the
pioneer files its NDA, there are no safety or efficacy data for the
new drug product in question; the point of the NDA is for a pioneer to provide such data to the FDA. In contrast, when the generic drug company files its generic drug product application with
the FDA, it may rely on the pioneer’s existing safety and efficacy
data for that drug product. For the generic company, producing
and submitting a second NDA would confer no additional benefit
beyond the pioneer’s NDA; the generic company would expend the
same research costs in order to merely duplicate the same safety
and efficacy findings.
Importantly, a generic drug product often cuts heavily into
the market formerly monopolized by the patent-holding pioneer.27
This competition is clearly bad for the pioneer’s profit margins
but good for patients and consumers who can obtain FDAapproved drug products at significantly lower costs. Congress consequently created an expedited process for generic drug product
approval within Hatch-Waxman “to speed the introduction of lowcost generic drugs to market.”28
Hatch-Waxman allows generic applicants to “piggyback” on
the clinical data supplied by pioneers29 by submitting “an abbreviated new drug application, or ANDA.”30 The only scientific data
required in an ANDA is a showing “that the generic drug is
‘bioequivalent’ to the [pioneer] drug.”31 Usually, bioequivalence

26

Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(C)).
See Matthew Avery, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by Pharmaceutical Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 171, 172
(2008) (“Generic drugs can capture 80–90% of the market, often within months of entering
the marketplace.”); Michael A. Carrier, Mark A. Lemley & Shawn Miller, Playing Both
Sides? Branded Sales, Generic Drugs, and Antitrust Policy, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 307, 313
(2020) (“Once a generic enters the market, the brand product on average loses 90% of its
market share within the first year.”).
28 Caraco Pharm. Lab’ys, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566 U.S. 399, 405 (2012) (citing
Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 676).
29 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 142 (2013).
30 Celgene Corp. v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 17 F.4th 1111, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“With
an ANDA, a generic-drug sponsor need not repeat a brand drug’s safety-and-efficacy trials
at great (and scientifically redundant) expense.”).
31 Kelly, supra note 23, at 423 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv)) (“[I]nstead of having to supply FDA with clinical data demonstrating the safety and effectiveness of the
drug, the only scientific study that generic manufacturers need to submit to FDA is one
demonstrating that the generic drug is ‘bioequivalent’ to the [pioneer] drug.”). Bioequivalence is measured by “the rate and extent of absorption of the drug,” which might be
27
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studies are cheaper and faster for the generic ANDA applicant
than the original safety-and-efficacy studies were for the pioneer
NDA applicant.32 Therefore, were bioequivalence studies the only
part of an ANDA application, generic ANDA applicants could enter drug markets at far lower costs and much more quickly than
the pioneer NDA applicant.
B. Pharmaceutical Patent Infringement Litigation
In addition to scientific bioequivalence data, however, an
ANDA must also, by statute, address the pioneer’s patents that
cover its drug. A generic ANDA applicant’s strategic decision to
piggyback on a pioneer’s safety and efficacy data can, because of
Hatch-Waxman’s statutory scheme, create the risk of patent
infringement litigation.
Despite the significant expense of drug development, new
drug products often generate substantial revenues for pioneers
because of monopoly profits secured by patents.33 Indeed, the
“pharmaceutical industry is one of the few industries that
requires patent protection to ensure the profitability of its innovative products.”34 As a result, pioneers almost uniformly have
patents protecting their FDA-approved drug products. In fact, the
FDA is required by statute to maintain a public list of FDAapproved new drug products and related patents in the so-called
“Orange Book.”35
Regardless of any patents, under Hatch-Waxman, a generic
ANDA applicant may use the patented drug if the use is “reasonably related to the development and submission of” an ANDA.36
affected by, for example, different pill formulations or methods of administration for a
generic drug product. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(8)(B); see also Kelly, supra note 23, at 423 & n.66.
32 See Celgene, 17 F.4th at 1117 (“With an ANDA, a generic-drug sponsor need not
repeat a brand drug’s safety-and-efficacy trials at great (and scientifically redundant)
expense.”).
33 See Carrier et al., supra note 27, at 318, 321 (reporting, for thirty-six firms studied,
that branded pharmaceutical sales increased from $35.2 billion in 1992 to $292.2 billion
in 2016, and that “brand sales remain about 80% of all sales”).
34 Avery, supra note 27, at 171.
35 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(7)(A); Kelly, supra note 23, at 422.
36 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). Before Hatch-Waxman, under the Federal Circuit’s holding
in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), the use
of FDA-approved drug products that related to the preparation and submission of an
ANDA constituted patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). See id. at 861–64.
Because of Roche, “generic manufacturers were forced to wait until the pioneer’s patent
term expired before they could begin the development and approval processes for their
generic drugs,” and “[t]his gave pioneers a de facto extension of their patent terms during
the period the generic manufacturers spent testing and seeking FDA review.” Avery, supra
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Performing bioequivalence studies for an ANDA, for instance, is
not actionable patent infringement. After bioequivalence studies
are completed, however, Hatch-Waxman requires a generic
ANDA applicant to make a strategic decision about how to confront a pioneer’s patents.
A generic ANDA applicant may opt to wait to sell or market
its generic drug product until after a pioneer’s patents expire.37
Alternatively, if a generic applicant considers a pioneer’s patents
invalid or believes that its sale or marketing of a generic drug
product would not infringe on a pioneer’s patents, it may attempt
to accelerate market entry by challenging that pioneer’s existing
patent monopoly. The generic applicant may do so through a statutory mechanism contained in 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) called
a Paragraph IV certification, which permits an ANDA applicant
to challenge existing Orange Book patents of a pioneer’s FDAapproved drug product.38 A Paragraph IV certification declares
that, in the ANDA applicant’s opinion, an Orange Book–listed patent for a pioneer drug product is either “invalid or will not be
infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for
which the application is submitted.”39
A Paragraph IV certification submitted in an ANDA often
provokes litigation.40 But such litigation is not conventional pa-

note 27, at 175. The Hatch-Waxman Act, via 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), corrected this de facto
term extension.
37 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). If a generic ANDA applicant decides not to directly
challenge a pioneer’s active patents, instead filing a Paragraph I, II, or III certification,
there is usually no patent infringement litigation. This is because the generic applicant
certifies either that there are no Orange Book–listed patents to infringe (Paragraph I),
that any Orange Book–listed patent has already expired (Paragraph II), or, if the generic
applicant evaluates the pioneer’s listed patents as unassailable, that the generic drug will
not be marketed until after any Orange Book–listed patents expire (Paragraph III). See
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
38 To incentivize ANDA applicants to challenge weak patents or innovate around existing patents, Hatch-Waxman provides the first ANDA applicant to file under Paragraph IV with a 180-day period of market exclusivity. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
During this 180-day period, the FDA will not approve any later-filing generic applicant’s
ANDA application; the first-filing Paragraph IV generic applicant is essentially allowed
the exclusive right to compete with the pioneer. Hatch-Waxman’s generic exclusivity prize
is potentially worth millions of dollars. See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 144.
39 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
40 Hatch-Waxman incentivizes pioneers to initiate immediate litigation against
Paragraph IV ANDA applicants. If a pioneer initiates litigation within a forty-five-day
window of receiving notice of the generic drug company’s ANDA application, approval of
the generic drug product is stayed for thirty months, temporarily maintaining the pioneer’s monopoly. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
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tent infringement litigation because ANDA-related use of a pioneer’s patented drug is exempted from patent infringement under
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). Instead, Hatch-Waxman contains a subsequent provision, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2), that allows pioneers and
generic applicants to resolve any “infringement dispute . . . before
the generic drug hits the market.”41 Strikingly, this HatchWaxman provision states that it is “an act of infringement to
submit”42 a Paragraph IV ANDA.43 In other words, HatchWaxman creates an unusual cause of action for patent infringement that derives solely from a filing with a federal regulatory
agency. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has called the HatchWaxman patent infringement scheme “a highly artificial act of
infringement that consists of submitting an ANDA.”44
Hatch-Waxman litigation can be quite complex for two related reasons. First, Hatch-Waxman litigation regularly proceeds
in parallel against many defendants. Because marketing a
generic alternative can be immensely profitable,45 pioneers frequently face multiple ambitious ANDA filers.46 Pioneers must engage in litigation with each of those generic applicants to protect
their patent monopolies.47
Second, Hatch-Waxman litigation regularly proceeds in multiple locations because the multiple ANDA applicants “do not all
reside in the same district.”48 Ideally—for efficiency’s sake and to
ensure consistent judicial rulings on similar invalidity or noninfringement arguments—a Hatch-Waxman plaintiff would prefer
to consolidate litigation before a single judge in a single district

41 Cf. Kelly, supra note 23, at 424. If a generic drug product enters and quickly captures a large portion of the pioneer’s market but is later found to infringe on the pioneer’s
valid, enforceable patent(s) and is enjoined from sales, the upheaval in the pharmaceutical
market from removing a significantly cheaper alternative generic drug could be severe
and painful. The Hatch-Waxman statutory scheme attempts to prevent such disruptions.
42 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (emphasis added).
43 See Kelly, supra note 23, at 424. (“The Hatch-Waxman Act added this artificial
infringement provision to protect NDA patent holders, so that the infringement dispute
could be resolved before the generic drug hits the market.”).
44 Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 678; see also Valeant, 978 F.3d at 1381 (collecting cases).
45 See supra notes 27, 38.
46 See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., No. CV 17-379-LPS, 2017 WL
3980155, at *12 n.17 (D. Del. Sept. 11, 2017).
47 As an example, in In re Rosuvastatin Calcium Pat. Litig., MDL No. 08-1949, 2008
WL 5046424 (D. Del. Nov. 24, 2008), a Hatch-Waxman plaintiff that had developed the
drug product Crestor filed separate actions for patent infringement against at least seven
different groups of defendants, all generic ANDA applicants, in three different district
courts. Id. at *6–7.
48 Bristol-Myers Squibb, at *12 n.17.
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court. To do so, a Hatch-Waxman plaintiff must establish venue
and jurisdiction in the same district court for all defendants. But
if a pioneer attempts this and fails because the court dismisses
the suit against one or more generic applicants for lack of venue
or jurisdiction, the pioneer might lose the benefit of the statutory
thirty-month stay of generic approval.49 The stay of generic approval only survives while litigation is ongoing.50 Therefore, to
protect against dismissal and preserve the thirty-month stay, a
pioneer will usually file parallel protective suits in multiple different district courts, intending to properly establish venue and
jurisdiction against every defendant in at least one district.51
II. VALEANT, CELGENE, AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S HATCHWAXMAN VENUE JURISPRUDENCE
As a threshold matter, in Hatch-Waxman litigation the plaintiff—a pioneer that wishes to enforce active patents—faces the
question of venue. Recent case law has significantly altered the
patent venue rules for Hatch-Waxman litigants. This Part overviews those recent changes. Part II.A reviews general changes to
patent venue law established by the Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in TC Heartland. Part II.B details how the general changes
to patent venue law from TC Heartland have affected venue law
for Hatch-Waxman litigation by examining the recent Federal
Circuit cases Valeant and Celgene Corp. v. Mylan
Pharmaceuticals Inc.52

49 See Abbreviated New Drug Applications and 505(b)(2) Applications, 81 Fed.
Reg. 69,580, 69,627 (Oct. 6, 2016) (Response 59) (“[T]he 30-month period . . . will be terminated if the court(s) enter(s) an order of dismissal without a finding of infringement in
each pending suit for patent infringement brought within 45 days of receipt of the notice
of paragraph IV certification sent by the . . . ANDA applicant.”)
50 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2).
51 See Amanda Walton Newton, Note, Tightening the Gilstrap: How TC Heartland
Limited the Pharmaceutical Industry When It Reined in the Federal Circuit, 25 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 255, 279 (2018) (describing why protective suits have become particularly important for preserving a pioneer’s thirty-month stay of generic approval in lieu of recent
changes to patent venue law—after TC Heartland—described infra in Part III); cf.
Abbreviated New Drug Applications and 505(b)(2) Applications, 81 Fed. Reg. at 69,627
(Response 59).
52 17 F.4th 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
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A. TC Heartland’s Recent Changes to the Patent Venue Rules
Venue is substantively and procedurally distinct from jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is about “constitutional authority” and “relates to the power of a federal court to hear and determine a cause
or to adjudicate.”53 Venue, in contrast, “is a creature of statute,
intended to limit the potential districts where one may be called
upon to defend oneself in any given matter to those that are fair
and reasonably convenient.”54
Venue for Hatch-Waxman litigation is dictated by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1400(b), the patent venue statute.55 Under that statute, a plaintiff bears “the burden of establishing proper venue”56 and has two
options for doing so. A Hatch-Waxman plaintiff may establish
venue either (1) where a generic ANDA applicant “resides”; or
(2) where a generic ANDA applicant has both “committed acts of
infringement and has a regular and established place of
business.”57
For many years, the Federal Circuit interpreted the word “resides” in the patent venue statute to construe venue as essentially
coextensive with personal jurisdiction.58 Furthermore, the
Federal Circuit later determined that “planned future acts were
sufficient to justify the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction
over a defendant in ANDA cases.”59 Importantly, a generic ANDA
applicant’s planned future acts included any plans to sell “its generic drugs throughout the United States.”60 Thus, a HatchWaxman plaintiff would likely have been able to establish specific
personal jurisdiction—and therefore venue—in a suit against a
generic ANDA applicant in any federal district court.

53

32A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 1082 (2021).
Id. (emphasis added) (citing KM Enter., Inc. v. Glob. Traffic Techs., Inc., 725 F.3d
718, 724 (7th Cir. 2013)).
55 The patent venue statute reads: “Any civil action for patent infringement may be
brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has
committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.” 28
U.S.C. § 1400(b).
56 Celgene, 17 F.4th at 1119.
57 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
58 See Valeant, 978 F.3d at 1379 (citing VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance
Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1990), overruled by TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. 1514
(2017)) (noting that VE Holding Corp. held that “changes to the general venue statute
meant that, in patent cases, corporations reside in every venue where personal jurisdiction
is proper”).
59 Id. (citing Acorda Therapeutics Inc. v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 817 F.3d 755, 760 (Fed.
Cir. 2016)).
60 See Acorda, 817 F.3d at 763.
54
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That changed in 2017. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the patent venue statute in TC Heartland severely curtailed
venue options for Hatch-Waxman plaintiffs. TC Heartland directly overruled the Federal Circuit’s broad reading of the first
prong of the patent venue statute61 (“where the defendant resides”) by limiting the meaning of “resides” under the statute to a
defendant’s state of incorporation.62 In the aftermath, the Federal
Circuit has adopted a narrow reading of the patent venue
statute.63
B. Valeant and Celgene’s Interpretation of the Patent Venue
Rules for Hatch-Waxman Litigants
In this shifting legal landscape, Hatch-Waxman plaintiffs
have attempted to establish venue under the second prong of the
venue statute by filing suit in districts where the defendant has
purportedly committed “acts of infringement.”64 But the HatchWaxman act of infringement is the “highly artificial”65 infringing
act of “submit[ting]”66 an ANDA to the FDA. Recently, important
cases have addressed the questions of exactly which acts constitute “acts of infringement” under Hatch-Waxman and where, for
venue purposes, these acts occur.
61 Notably, TC Heartland did not overrule the Federal Circuit’s broad reading of specific personal jurisdiction in Hatch-Waxman litigation based on planned future acts. For
Hatch-Waxman litigants, under current Federal Circuit jurisprudence, specific personal
jurisdiction likely still can be established nationwide; only venue options are more limited
for Hatch-Waxman litigants after TC Heartland. See Valeant, 978 F.3d at 1379:

Prior to 2017, defendants hoping to transfer Hatch-Waxman cases to a different
district generally objected to a plaintiff’s chosen venue on personal jurisdiction
grounds. We definitively resolved those arguments in Acorda Therapeutics Inc.
v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., 817 F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir. 2016), where we held
that planned future acts were sufficient to justify the exercise of specific personal
jurisdiction over a defendant in ANDA cases. . . . The practical significance of
Acorda was markedly contracted when the Supreme Court changed the venue
landscape for patent cases in TC Heartland.
62

See TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. at 1519–21.
See, e.g., Valeant, 978 F.3d at 1379 (“When faced with other questions growing out
of TC Heartland, we have narrowly construed the requirements of venue in patent cases.”);
In re Google LLC, 949 F.3d 1338, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“[T]he Supreme Court has cautioned against a broad reading of the venue statute.”); In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1361
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[T]he requirement of venue is specific and unambiguous; it is not one of
those vague principles which, in the interests of some overriding policy, is to be given a
liberal construction.” (quoting Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 365 U.S. 260, 264
(1961))).
64 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
65 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 678 (1990).
66 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2).
63
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The first of those cases, Valeant, involved a Hatch-Waxman
patent infringement lawsuit filed by Valeant against Mylan, a generic ANDA applicant, related to Valeant’s drug Jublia for treating fungal toenail infections.67 Although Mylan is a West Virginia
corporation with its principal place of business in West Virginia,
Valeant attempted to file suit in the District of New Jersey,68
which is a common location for Hatch-Waxman litigation.69 In
parallel litigation, Valeant filed lawsuits against no fewer than
twenty-four other generic ANDA applicants in the District of New
Jersey.70 Valeant also filed parallel protective suits, including
against Mylan in the Northern District of West Virginia.71
Mylan challenged venue in the District of New Jersey, arguing that “the only alleged act of infringement—submission of the
ANDA—did not occur in New Jersey” but had instead occurred in
West Virginia.72 The district court largely agreed, holding that
“the two places where an act of infringement might have occurred
before the filing of the action were West Virginia and Maryland
[where the FDA received the ANDA], not New Jersey.”73 Thus, the
district court dismissed the patent infringement claims for
improper venue.74
In the lower court and on appeal to the Federal Circuit,
Valeant asserted that venue in New Jersey was proper. Valeant’s
main argument was that, for venue purposes, “planned future
conduct,” including the planned nationwide sale of a generic drug
product, constituted an “act of infringement” under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1400(b).75 The Federal Circuit disagreed.76 Based on its reading
67

Valeant, 978 F.3d at 1376.
Id.
69 See Shawn P. Miller, Venue One Year After TC Heartland: An Early Empirical
Assessment of the Major Changes in Patent Filing, 52 AKRON L. REV. 763, 803–04 (2018).
70 See Order Consolidating Cases for All Purposes, Valeant Pharmaceuticals North
America LLC v. Strides Pharma Inc., No. 3:19-cv-00133 (D.N.J. Jan. 4, 2019), ECF No. 10
(listing cases to be consolidated in caption).
71 See Valeant, 978 F.3d at 1377.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 1378.
74 See Valeant Pharms. N. Am. LLC v. Zydus Pharms. (USA) Inc., No. 18-cv-13635,
2019 WL 4179832, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 14, 2019), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded
sub nom., Valeant, 978 F.3d 1374.
75 Valeant, 978 F.3d at 1377.
76 The Federal Circuit in Valeant was resolving a district court split. Compare
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., No. CV 17-379-LPS, 2017 WL 3980155,
at *8 (D. Del. Sept. 11, 2017) (“[T]he Court concludes that in the context of Hatch-Waxman
litigation, the ‘acts of infringement’ an ANDA filer ‘has committed’ includes all of the acts
that would constitute ordinary patent infringement if, upon FDA approval, the generic
drug product is launched into the market.”), and Celgene Corp. v. Hetero Labs Ltd.,
68
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of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A), the Federal Circuit held that “infringement occurs for venue purposes only in districts where actions related to the submission of an [ANDA] occur.”77 The Federal
Circuit, however, declined to “define what all relevant acts involved in the preparation and submission of an ANDA might be,
leaving those questions for other cases where the precise contours
are presented and briefed.”78
Celgene involved a similar fact pattern. Celgene initiated
Hatch-Waxman litigation against “many drug companies,” including Mylan, based on the ANDAs filed by those companies related to Celgene’s cancer drug Pomalyst.79 Celgene filed suit in
the District of New Jersey; Mylan moved to dismiss for improper
venue.80 The district court agreed to dismiss the claims against
Mylan.
Celgene argued that New Jersey satisfied the statutory
venue requirements based on the finer details of HatchWaxman’s notice provisions. Specifically, the FDA’s regulations
require ANDA applicants to provide notice to the pioneer that
they have filed a Paragraph IV ANDA and to then amend the
ANDA to include proof that notice was in fact delivered.81 Celgene
argued that receipt of the notice letter at its headquarters in New
Jersey was part of the ANDA submission for venue purposes.82
The Federal Circuit disagreed. Celgene first reaffirmed the
holding from Valeant that “it is the [ANDA] submission that infringes.”83 Celgene also reiterated that “acts involved in [the

No. 17-3387, 2018 WL 1135334, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 2, 2018) (relying on the reasoning in
Bristol-Myers Squibb for determining venue), with Galderma Lab’ys, L.P. v. Teva Pharms.
USA, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 3d 599, 608 (N.D. Tex. 2017) (“This Court declines to find that an
act of infringement occurs wherever an ANDA filer intends to market the accused product.”). In Valeant, the Federal Circuit did reiterate that its specific personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence allowed a showing of “minimum contacts” in any district court based on an
ANDA submission, thereby leaving Acorda’s holding undisturbed, 817 F.3d 755. Valeant
specifically stated that its narrow reading of venue was distinct from, and justified on
different grounds than, its specific personal jurisdiction jurisprudence for Hatch-Waxman
litigants. See Valeant, 978 F.3d at 1384 (“[W]e would be remiss to treat venue and personal
jurisdiction as the same inquiry.”).
77 Valeant, 978 F.3d at 1375.
78 Id. at 1384 n.8.
79 See Celgene, 17 F.4th at 1116–17.
80 See id. at 1117, 1119.
81 See Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug, 21 C.F.R. § 314.95(a),
(e).
82 See Celgene, 17 F.4th at 1121.
83 Id. (emphasis in original).

2022]

Toward a Centralized Hatch-Waxman Venue

1851

ANDA submission’s] ‘preparation’” may still constitute acts of infringement for the purposes of the patent venue statute if those
preparatory acts “at a minimum, [are] fairly . . . part of the submission—not merely ‘related to’ it in some broader sense.”84
Decisively, however, the Federal Circuit noted that “although the
ANDA applicant must later send a notice letter and inform the
FDA of the letter’s receipt, that all happens after the infringing
submission.”85 Therefore, as in Valeant, no acts of infringement
occurred in New Jersey, and venue was correctly held improper
in that district.86
After Valeant and Celgene, litigants know that they cannot
establish venue in Hatch-Waxman litigation in any district nationwide by default. Litigants also know that they can establish
venue in Hatch-Waxman litigation under the patent venue rules,
in part, where a generic applicant’s relevant acts of infringement—those that are part of an ANDA submission—occur. Nonetheless, Valeant and Celgene left the “precise contours” of the
patent venue rules undefined.87 The Federal Circuit left it to future litigation to resolve what acts are legally relevant, for venue
purposes, in ANDA submissions. Perhaps most significantly,
Valeant and Celgene left Hatch-Waxman litigants without flexible venue rules that allow for the consolidation, in a single district
and ideally before a single judge, of the numerous “largely identical suits” that often arise during Hatch-Waxman litigation.88
III. CENTRALIZING HATCH-WAXMAN VENUE IN THE DISTRICT OF
MARYLAND
The “precise contours”89 of the patent venue rules can have
significant consequences in terms of litigation costs and judicial
efficiency and organization. Recall that a plaintiff may establish
venue in a patent infringement suit “where the defendant resides,
or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and
has a regular and established place of business.” 90 Given the limitations on the “resides” prong of the patent venue statute imposed by TC Heartland, a pioneer might try to use the second acts

84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 1122 (emphasis in original).
See id.
Valeant, 978 F.3d at 1384 n.8.
Contra Bristol-Myers Squibb, 2017 WL 3980155, at *12 n.17.
Valeant, 978 F.3d at 1384 n.8.
28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
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of infringement prong of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) to find a convenient,
centralized venue to pursue all related Hatch-Waxman litigation
stemming from a single drug product. However, as explained, if
the patent venue rules do not allow for any centralized HatchWaxman venue, the pioneer may “be required to file and maintain
largely identical suits in multiple districts.”91
Inflexible patent venue rules thus increase the “time and expense” that is required “to resolve the cases.”92 In essence, spreading Hatch-Waxman litigation over multiple courts wastes judicial
resources as multiple judges must hear and decide the same fundamental noninfringement or invalidity arguments. Moreover,
such duplicative litigation could result “in inconsistent judgments”93 at the district court level, where one generic’s noninfringement or invalidity arguments succeed but another generic’s
identical arguments, made before a different judge, fail. Such inconsistency could create undesirable uncertainty and instability
in the generic drug market. Indeed, the entire point of the HatchWaxman statutory scheme is to resolve any “infringement
dispute . . . before the generic drug hits the market,”94 and inconsistent judgments at the district court level could strongly impede
that objective. Some courts have already indicated that multidistrict litigation cannot completely solve this efficiency problem.95
The Federal Circuit, in Valeant, ultimately felt legally compelled by the “plain language of the two statutes at issue”96 to
reach a conclusion that disfavored flexible options for a nationalized or centralized Hatch-Waxman venue. The court, however,
was “sympathetic”97 to the policy concerns favoring a centralized
venue and found them “intuitively persuasive.”98 The Federal
Circuit was especially concerned that its holding would result in
91 Valeant, 978 F.3d at 1383 (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb, 2017 WL 3980155,
at *12 n.17).
92 Id.
93 Id. (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb, 2017 WL 3980155, at *12 n.17).
94 Kelly, supra note 23, at 424.
95 See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 2017 WL 3980155, at *12 n.17 (emphasis added):

While the Joint Panel on Multidistrict Litigation might, in these circumstances,
be expected to create more Hatch-Waxman multidistrict litigations (‘MDLs’), the
process of creating an MDL often involves litigation (adding time and expense)
and, even once created, cases are transferred to an MDL only for pretrial purposes. They must be transferred back to the transferor districts for trial, unless
a party waives its right to be transferred back.
96
97
98

Valeant, 978 F.3d at 1385.
Id.
Id. at 1383.
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“lost judicial efficiencies in the handling of these mostly multidefendant cases.”99
Perhaps motivated by these concerns, the Federal Circuit
raised the possibility that the District of Maryland might always
satisfy the acts of infringement prong of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).100
Under this theory, proper receipt by the FDA in Maryland serves
as the final act that operationalizes an ANDA submission under
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) and initiates Hatch-Waxman litigation. As
such, receipt of an ANDA submission by the FDA is “fairly [ ] part
of” the ANDA submission, not “merely ‘related to’ it in some
broader sense.”101 Overall, this would mean that each ANDA submission necessarily includes an act of infringement—the receipt
of the ANDA by the FDA—in the District of Maryland. A HatchWaxman litigant, consequently, would always be able to satisfy
the acts of infringement prong of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) in the
District of Maryland.
By holding that an ANDA submitter always commits an act
of infringement in the District of Maryland, a court would not, de
facto, create a centralized Hatch-Waxman venue. In addition to
committing an act of infringement, under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), a
defendant would need to have “a regular and established place of
business” in Maryland for venue to be proper.102 After TC
Heartland, the Federal Circuit has also articulated limitations on
the “place of business” prong of the patent venue statute.103 However, it remains unclear whether the Federal Circuit’s rulings on
the place of business prong set a particularly stringent standard.
For example, one district court recently ruled that Amazon lockers constitute a regular and established place of business of Amazon for venue purposes.104 Another Federal Circuit judge has
suggested the possibility that “Google is indeed doing business at

99

Id. at 1385.
See id. at 1384 n.8 (“While it may well be that the District of Maryland satisfies
the test for venue that we have laid out here, we do not resolve that question.”).
101 Celgene, 17 F.4th at 1121 (emphasis and quotation marks omitted).
102 See 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
103 See, e.g., In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (finding that work
conducted from an employee’s home is insufficient to establish a place of business); In re
Google LLC, 949 F.3d 1338, 1345–47 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (finding that computer servers
hosted by a contractor, standing alone, are insufficient to establish a place of business);
Celgene, 17 F.4th at 1122–27 (finding that employees’ homes and a separate subsidiary’s
office did not establish a place of business).
104 Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 1:18-cv-00549 (BKS/CFH), 2019
WL 3755446, at *14 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2019).
100
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the computer of each of its users/customers.”105 Ultimately, the
place of business prong in the context of Hatch-Waxman venue is
still loosely defined.106 If the courts define place of business narrowly, pioneers would find it more difficult to consolidate venue.
But the Federal Circuit’s concern with the policy implications of
limiting venue in Hatch-Waxman litigation specifically suggests
that a broad reading of the place of business prong, at least in
Hatch-Waxman cases, could accompany any developments in the
court’s reading of the acts of infringement prong.
Importantly, however, holding that the FDA’s receipt of the
ANDA submission counts as an “act of infringement” in the
District of Maryland for venue purposes would make centralizing
venue meaningfully easier for Hatch-Waxman litigants. The following sections argue, first, that courts should do so for reasons
founded in substantive and procedural law and, second, that they
should do so as a matter of sound venue policy.
A. Receipt of the ANDA by the FDA Is Part of the ANDA
Submission
In Valeant, the Federal Circuit signaled that pressing the
button,107 so to speak, that formally sends a proper ANDA to the
FDA is the most clear-cut act of infringement under 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(2).108 At least one district court has understood Valeant
to stand for the proposition that the second prong of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1400(b) “is met by filing the lawsuit in the state where the
[ANDA] was filed.” 109 The Federal Circuit itself has also stated

105

Google, 949 F.3d at 1348 (Wallach, J., concurring).
Although a full analysis of the place of business prong in the Hatch-Waxman context is beyond the scope of this Comment, other commentators have more generally argued
that the patent venue statute’s place of business prong is ripe for further doctrinal development. See, e.g., Micah Quigley, Comment, Simplifying Patent Venue, 87 U. CHI. L. REV.
1893, 1925–33 (2020) (suggesting that courts focus on and develop doctrine around the
“place” requirement of the patent venue statute’s place of business prong).
107 The ANDA would almost certainly be submitted online in an electronic format. See
Galderma Lab’ys, L.P. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 3d 599, 609 (N.D. Tex.
2017) (citing Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) Forms and Submission Requirements, FDA (Mar. 7, 2022), https://perma.cc/8UQ4-HGU5) (“The FDA no longer accepts
paper ANDA submissions. All ANDA submissions MUST be in [electronic] format.”).
108 See Valeant, 978 F.3d at 1381 (“A plain language reading of this provision directs
us to the conclusion that it is the submission of the ANDA, and only the submission, that
constitutes an act of infringement in this context.”).
109 Fresenius Kabi USA, LLC v. CUSTOpharm, Inc., No. 20-cv-03254, 2021 WL
849635, at *2 (D. Colo. Jan. 26, 2021) (citing Valeant, 978 F.3d at 1375), report and recommendation adopted, No. 20-cv-03254, 2021 WL 651022 (D. Colo. Feb. 19, 2021).
106
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that Valeant “means venue is proper ‘where an ANDA-filer submits its ANDA to the FDA.’” 110 For example, sending an ANDA to
the FDA from New Jersey would mean that an act of infringement
had occurred, for venue purposes, in the District of New Jersey.
In contrast, while formally sending a proper ANDA to the
FDA is clearly an act of infringement, it is equally clear that actions taken after an ANDA is properly submitted cannot retroactively become part of that earlier submission. The Federal Circuit
in Celgene, for instance, explicitly stated that acts taken to comply with Hatch-Waxman’s Paragraph IV notice requirements do
not constitute infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2).111 HatchWaxman’s notice provisions relate to acts that happen “after the
infringing submission.”112 Therefore, the Federal Circuit concluded that “[s]ending a paragraph IV notice letter does not fall
within ‘submitting’ the ANDA.”113 Basically, actions taken to comply with Hatch-Waxman’s notice provisions occur too late to be
useful in establishing venue under the patent venue statute.
FDA receipt of an ANDA falls directly between these two
events. There are a number of legal arguments, however, both
substantive and procedural, that strongly support the conclusion
that an ANDA submission occurs, at least in part, in the district
where the FDA receives it—the District of Maryland. First,
Federal Circuit case law directly supports the proposition that an
ANDA submission occurs where the FDA receives the ANDA.
Second, a number of district court cases hold that an actionable
ANDA submission has not occurred until the FDA formally receives the ANDA. Third, the Hatch-Waxman Act’s text and purpose support a statutory interpretation of the word “submit” that
involves receipt of the ANDA submission in Maryland. Fourth,
the Supreme Court’s guidance on statutory causes of action further supports the argument that an ANDA applicant proximately
causes the FDA to receive the ANDA in Maryland. Fifth, comparisons with other areas of law suggest that Hatch-Waxman’s cause
of action only accrues when the FDA has properly received an
ANDA.

110

Celgene, 17 F.4th at 1120 (quoting Valeant, 978 F.3d at 1378–79).
See id. at 1121–22 (disagreeing with the argument that receiving the notice letter
is part of the infringing act because the ANDA submission precedes and is separate from
the notice). For a brief overview of the Paragraph IV ANDA notice scheme that HatchWaxman establishes, see id. at 1121.
112 Id. at 1122 (emphasis in original).
113 Id.
111
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1. An ANDA applicant commits a federal tort in Maryland.
Federal Circuit case law directly supports the idea that receipt of a proper ANDA by the FDA should be considered part of
an ANDA submission. In Zeneca Ltd. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals
Inc.,114 the Federal Circuit expressly stated that a generic ANDA
applicant, by filing its ANDA, had “purposefully committed a federal tort in Maryland”115—the statutory tort of patent infringement under Hatch-Waxman.116 Zeneca further elaborated that
“[a] party that commits a federal tort in a state is on notice that
it may be haled into court in that state.”117 Moreover, Zeneca noted
that a Hatch-Waxman plaintiff would have “a legitimate interest
in litigating in Maryland because it could consolidate cases arising from the filing of two different ANDA’s with respect to the
same patent, which may result in judicial and litigant
economy.”118
Critically, for venue purposes, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) concerns
“where the defendant has committed acts of infringement.”119 The
plain language of the statute shows that actions taken solely by
the FDA cannot be used to establish venue, even if these actions
are acts of infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2). In HatchWaxman cases like Zeneca, however, the generic ANDA applicants themselves submitted the applications to the FDA in the
District of Maryland. Further, according to Zeneca, it is the generic ANDA applicant, not the FDA, who has “purposefully committed a federal tort in Maryland.”120
Zeneca, to be clear, was a case about personal jurisdiction
that predated the Federal Circuit’s current broad personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. For constitutional reasons related to an
ANDA applicant’s right to petition the federal government,
114

173 F.3d 829 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Id. at 833.
116 See Peter E. Strand, Back to Bedrock: Constitutional Underpinnings Set ‘New’
Standards for Patent Infringement Causation, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 375, 379 (2002)
(“Suits for patent infringement are actually tort suits.”); Amy L. Landers, Proximate Cause
and Patent Law, 25 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 329, 331 (2019) (“Patent infringement is considered a form of tort that originates from the Patent Act.” (first citing Carbice Corp. of
Am. v. Am. Pats. Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33 (1931); and then citing Arctic Cat Inc. v.
Bombardier Recreational Prod. Inc., 876 F.3d 1350, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2017))).
117 Zeneca, 173 F.3d at 833.
118 Id. at 834 (emphasis added).
119 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (emphasis added).
120 Zeneca, 173 F.3d at 833 (discussing how the government contacts exception, as the
question certified on appeal, means that the court must also consider the right to petition
the government).
115
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Zeneca eventually held that personal jurisdiction for ANDA applicants was improper in the District of Maryland because of the
government contacts exception.121 Nonetheless, the Federal
Circuit’s opinion in Zeneca carefully argued that its holding, relying on the government contacts exception, required as a premise
the conclusion that ANDA applicants directly commit a federal
tort in Maryland.122 So, importantly, Zeneca’s statement that an
ANDA submission constitutes a federal tort that occurs, in part,
in Maryland is not dicta. That position—that ANDA applicants
commit an act of infringement in Maryland—has never been explicitly or implicitly overruled.
2. Proper receipt is an essential procedural part of an
ANDA submission.
A related line of cases further supports the idea that proper
receipt of an ANDA by the FDA is an essential procedural part of
an ANDA submission; thus, proper receipt should be sufficient to
establish an act of infringement under the patent venue statute.
First, in SB Pharmco Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Mutual Pharmaceutical
Co.,123 a district court faced a generic ANDA applicant that had
sent Paragraph IV notice to the pioneer without confirmation of
receipt from the FDA.124 The court noted that “[u]nder the statute
and regulations, the sending of notice of a Paragraph IV certification [from the generic to the pioneer] is expressly predicated upon

121 See id. at 834. Judge Arthur Gajarsa would have found sufficient contacts between
the ANDA applicant the District of Maryland under traditional personal jurisdiction
analysis but for the government contacts exception. See id. at 833–34 (“[U]nder traditional
personal jurisdiction analysis, there is no way to avoid the fact that Mylan has purposefully committed a federal tort in Maryland. . . . Thus, under traditional personal jurisdiction analysis, I believe the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Mylan in Maryland would
be permissible.”). Judge Randall Rader’s concurrence in Zeneca, in contrast, expressed unease with the idea that ANDA applicants had created sufficient contacts with the state of
Maryland such that personal jurisdiction would be proper, see id. at 834–36 (Rader, J.,
concurring). Judge Rader would have found a lack of jurisdiction in Maryland under traditional principles of personal jurisdiction analysis. Overall, Zeneca was a 2-1 vote with
Judge Rich dissenting without an opinion. The Federal Circuit later pointedly distinguished Zeneca when revising its personal jurisdiction jurisprudence in Acorda
Therapeutics Inc. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., 817 F.3d 755, 763 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
122 See Zeneca, 173 F.3d at 833–34.
123 552 F. Supp. 2d 500 (E.D. Pa. 2008), appeal dismissed by, 318 F. App’x 897 (Fed.
Cir. 2008).
124 SB Pharmco, 552 F. Supp. 2d at 503–04. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.101(b)(1) (2016) (describing receipt procedures); 21 C.F.R. § 314.95(b) (2016) (describing Paragraph IV notice
procedures).
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the ANDA applicant receiving its own notice and acknowledgment from the FDA that the submitted ANDA has been received.”125 Since the ANDA had “not been accepted as received
when the notice was sent,” the district court held that “the litigation process was prematurely sparked at a time when the danger
existed that the ANDA was in fact incomplete.”126 SB Pharmco
thus supports the proposition that unless and until the FDA formally receives the generic applicant’s ANDA, litigation based on
an ANDA submission cannot properly begin.
Second, and perhaps more strikingly, in Allergan, Inc. v.
Actavis, Inc.,127 the FDA refused to receive an ANDA that it
viewed as incomplete.128 The generic ANDA applicant nonetheless
sent a Paragraph IV notice letter to the pioneer.129 The court, relying on SB Pharmco, concluded that “the mere transmission of
documents purporting to be an ‘ANDA’ is insufficient to trigger
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2).”130 In other words,
without proper receipt by the FDA confirming that a generic applicant’s filing is truly a substantially complete ANDA, a generic
applicant has not committed actionable patent infringement.
In sum, SB Pharmco and Allergan strongly suggest that
without proper receipt of an ANDA by the FDA and subsequent
notice of that proper receipt, an applicant has not formally submitted an actionable ANDA submission. This interpretation
preserves Hatch-Waxman’s careful statutory ordering of the
events that initiate litigation. Further, reading Hatch-Waxman’s
cause of action under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) as requiring proper
receipt of the ANDA preserves judicial resources by preventing
premature or sham litigation.

125

SB Pharmco, 552 F. Supp. 2d at 507.
Id. at 508.
127 Case No. 14-CV-638, 2014 WL 7336692 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2014).
128 See id. at *9.
129 Id.
130 Id. at *10–13. Both SB Pharmco and Allergan thus foresaw the problem of potential sham litigation if merely filing a purported ANDA was sufficient to initiate litigation.
See SB Pharmco, 552 F. Supp. 2d at 508 (concluding that “in accepting an ANDA for review, so that it is received and not merely delivered,” receipt by the FDA “acts as a safeguard to prevent a potentially incomplete ANDA from triggering the litigation process”
(emphasis in original)); Allergan, 2014 WL 7336692, at *11 (“To hold otherwise would invite generic manufacturers to submit incomplete or otherwise deficient applications, in
order to secure their position as the first-filed generic.”); see also Amarin Pharma, Inc. v.
Apotex, Inc., No. 14-2550 (MLC), 2016 WL 287082, at *2–3 (D.N.J. Jan. 22, 2016) (following SB Pharmco and Allergan on similar facts).
126
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3. The statutory text fairly suggests that a valid ANDA
submission includes receipt.
Beyond case law, the text of the Hatch-Waxman statute itself
supports the statutory construction that submission of an ANDA
necessarily involves receipt of that ANDA by the FDA. The patent
venue statute allows venue, in part, wherever a defendant commits “acts of infringement,”131 and Hatch-Waxman makes it an act
of patent infringement “to submit” an ANDA.132 The statute could
be clearer—“submit” is not defined.133 Moreover, Hatch-Waxman
neither expressly specifies that its cause of action includes “receipt” of the ANDA nor states that merely “sending” or “mailing”
the ANDA to the FDA is actionable.
Nevertheless, principles of statutory construction indicate
that an ANDA is only submitted when properly received, and
therefore receipt of the ANDA at the FDA is part of the HatchWaxman cause of action. First, courts increasingly look to dictionaries to understand the meaning of undefined words.134 To
“submit” means “to present or propose to another for review, consideration, or decision” or “to deliver formally.”135 Submitting
something, in short, is defined by reference to the party receiving
that thing. If a dictionary definition is a proxy for ordinary meaning even in the specialized, technical context of patent disputes,136
Hatch-Waxman’s use of the word “submit” seems to suggest that
receipt is implicit in the cause of action of submitting an ANDA.
Similarly, more purposivist tools of statutory construction
also indicate that submission of an ANDA includes receipt by the
FDA. Given that at least one judge has “found no help in dictionary definitions” of the word “submit,”137 purposivist approaches
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28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2).
133 See In re Rosuvastatin Calcium Pat. Litig., MDL No. 08-1949, 2008 WL 5046424,
at *10 (D. Del. Nov. 24, 2008) (“The Hatch-Waxman Act does not provide a definition of
‘submit.’”).
134 See Joseph Scott Miller & James A. Hilsenteger, The Proven Key: Roles and Rules
for Dictionaries at the Patent Office and the Courts, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 829, 832 (2005)
(“Over the past twenty years, the Supreme Court has increasingly relied on dictionaries
to explain its constructions of legal text.”).
135 Submit Definition and Meaning, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (Jan. 31, 2022) (emphasis
added), https://perma.cc/MV9U-6TRG.
136 See Miller & Hilsenteger, supra note 134, at 843–51 (arguing that the Federal
Circuit, guided by the Supreme Court’s increasingly dictionary-based approach to statutory interpretation, has frequently used dictionary definitions to understand ordinary
meaning when interpreting patent claims).
137 Rosuvastatin, 2008 WL 5046424, at *10 (Stark, Mag. J.).
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are particularly warranted when interpreting Hatch-Waxman.
Indeed, Justice Antonin Scalia observed that because 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e) is not an “elegant piece of statutory draftsmanship,” it
can be reasonable to construe Hatch-Waxman’s language (and the
language of FDA’s derivative regulations) based on “substantive
intent.”138 Doing so fits within the Supreme Court’s broader approach to the “holistic endeavor” of statutory interpretation.139 As
the Court has pointed out:
A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often
clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme—because
the same terminology is used elsewhere in a context that
makes its meaning clear, or because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.140
Under both lines of reasoning, interpreting the word “submit” to
include proper receipt of the ANDA by the FDA is the superior
statutory construction.
First, at least one court has noted that the word “submit,” as
used in other parts of Hatch-Waxman, is used to imply “action on
the part of the party to whom the submission has been made.”141
For an ANDA submission, “the time of submission can be understood to refer to the time when that party is actually in a position
to take the relevant action, which is at the moment of actual receipt.”142 A Hatch-Waxman submission, in sum, necessarily implies receipt because a proper submission requires action by the
receiving party—in this case, the FDA.
Second, interpreting the word “submit” to include receipt by
the FDA preserves the highly intentional ordering of events in
Hatch-Waxman litigation.143 If a cause of action is created simply
because a generic applicant mails documents to the FDA—
documents that have “not been accepted as received” when litigation begins—“the litigation process [could be] prematurely
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See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 679 (1990).
United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365,
371 (1988).
140 Id. (citation omitted) (collecting cases).
141 TorPharm, Inc. v. Thompson, 260 F. Supp. 2d 69, 81 (D.D.C. 2003), aff’d sub nom.,
Purepac Pharm. Co. v. Thompson, 354 F.3d 877 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (interpreting the word
“submits,” as used in the related Hatch-Waxman provision 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(ii) governing notice of amendments).
142 Id.
143 See supra note 130.
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sparked at a time when the danger existed that the ANDA was in
fact incomplete.”144 The purpose of Hatch-Waxman’s careful statutory scheme is to resolve any “infringement dispute . . . before
the generic drug hits the market.”145 But statutory constructions
that allow premature and potentially sham litigation do nothing
to further that substantive goal of initiating and resolving patent
infringement litigation. In other words, interpreting “submit” to
include receipt by the FDA is a “permissible meaning[ ]” that best
“produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of
the law.”146
The FDA’s own regulations do present an important counterargument. Although receipt may be important for the HatchWaxman litigation scheme to proceed in an orderly manner, the
FDA’s regulations suggest that submission and receipt of an
ANDA are distinguishable acts. SB Pharmco and Allergan
explicitly state that an ANDA is only submitted—and therefore
legally actionable—when it is properly received.147 But the FDA’s
regulations specify that “[a]n ANDA will be evaluated after it is
submitted to determine whether the ANDA may be received.”148
In this sense, the FDA’s regulations make receipt by the FDA
sound more similar to the receipt of the Paragraph IV notice letter as analyzed in Celgene: a separate act that occurs after and
apart from the legally actionable submission of the ANDA.
This counterargument based solely on the FDA’s regulatory
text is ultimately unpersuasive. First, the FDA’s regulations
seem more like sloppy draftsmanship than a substantive statutory statement about when an ANDA is submitted. We only know
retroactively that a filing is and can be correctly referred to as an
ANDA—and not “the mere transmission of documents purporting
to be an ‘ANDA’” 149—because the filing was properly received by
the FDA. The FDA regulations thus appear to use “ANDA” as an
inaccurate shorthand for the set of filed documents that is later

144

SB Pharmco, 552 F. Supp. 2d at 508.
Kelly, supra note 23, at 424.
146 Cf. United Sav. Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 371.
147 See SB Pharmco, 552 F. Supp. 2d at 507–08; Allergan, 2014 WL 7336692,
at *10–13.
148 21 C.F.R. § 314.101(b)(1) (2016) (emphasis added); see also 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.101(b)(2) (2016) (“If FDA determines, upon evaluation, that an ANDA was substantially complete as of the date it was submitted to FDA, FDA will consider the ANDA to
have been received as of the date of submission.”).
149 Allergan, 2014 WL 7336692, at *13.
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confirmed, via receipt, to be a proper ANDA submission in the
first instance.
A better response is that, as the Supreme Court noted, it is
reasonable to construe Hatch-Waxman’s language, and therefore
the language of FDA’s derivative regulations, based on “substantive intent.”150 To reemphasize, interpreting the word “submit” in
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) to preserve the highly intentional ordering
of events in Hatch-Waxman litigation, to conserve judicial resources, and to prevent premature or sham litigation is a stronger
statutory construction than an overly literal reading based only
on imprecisely drafted FDA regulations. In sum, the text of the
statute should be primarily construed in light of the entirety of
the Hatch-Waxman Act and its carefully crafted procedures, not
in light of imprecise regulatory drafting. Doing so, in this case,
requires reading the word “submit” to include receipt.
4. Receipt proximately causes Hatch-Waxman’s statutory
act of infringement.
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on statutory causes of action also supports the idea that receipt of the ANDA by the FDA
is fairly “part of”151 the Hatch-Waxman Act’s statutory cause of
action. In Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc.,152 the Court applied a proximate-cause-based
analysis to determine limitations on liability in a Lanham Act
false advertising claim. Although Lexmark addressed limitations
on liability for plaintiffs, the same proximate cause principles logically apply in the Hatch-Waxman context, where the inquiry concerns limitations on liability for actions. Indeed, Celgene—by querying which acts are fairly “part of”153 and not “merely ‘related
to’” 154 an ANDA submission—invoked reasoning much like that
at play in tort proximate cause analysis. In turn, applying principles of proximate cause for statutory causes of action can help
clarify which acts are part of Hatch-Waxman’s cause of action.
Once courts make that determination, they can more easily resolve the venue question of where those acts occur.
Lexmark stated that “a statutory cause of action is limited to
plaintiffs whose injuries are proximately caused by violations of
150
151
152
153
154

Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 679.
Celgene, 17 F.4th at 1121 (emphasis in original).
572 U.S. 118 (2014).
Celgene, 17 F.4th at 1121 (emphasis in original).
Id. (quoting Valeant, 978 F.3d at 1384).
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the statute.”155Although Lexmark noted that “[t]he proximatecause inquiry is not easy to define,” the Supreme Court considered it unobjectionable that “[p]roximate-cause analysis is controlled by the nature of the statutory cause of action.”156When
determining the limits of liability for statutory causes of action,
“[t]he question . . . is whether the harm alleged has a sufficiently
close connection to the conduct the statute prohibits.”157
In Hatch-Waxman litigation, the ANDA submission is the
statutory violation that proximately causes the plaintiff’s injury.158 Case law strongly suggests that proper receipt of an
ANDA by the FDA is required for the legal harm related to HatchWaxman’s act of infringement to become actionable.159 More concretely, receipt by the FDA in Maryland is an event that proximately causes a generic applicant’s filing of papers, legally, to
become an actionable ANDA submission.160 Importantly, the generic ANDA applicant directly causes the FDA to receive the
ANDA by sending it to the agency. There is a direct causal chain
linking filing, to receipt, to submission. And if the ANDA is not
properly received by the FDA, there is, quite literally, no statutory cause of action and therefore no “unlawful conduct.”161
Receipt of an ANDA by the FDA, in conclusion, is not “‘too remote’
from the defendant’s unlawful conduct” for legal liability
to attach.162
5. Comparison with other areas of law supports the idea
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Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 132.
Id. at 133.
157 Id.
158 Cf. Pfizer Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., No. 08-cv-00948-LDD, 2009 WL 2843288, at *3 n.5
(D. Del. Aug. 13, 2009) (“That holding suggests that the location of the injury in an
infringement action based on an ANDA filing is the location of the preparation and submission of the ANDA.” (citing Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d
1558, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994))). Though an ANDA submission does not result in a concrete
injury at the time of filing, Congress recognized in Hatch-Waxman that a Paragraph IV
ANDA filing initiates a causal chain that would lead, directly and almost inevitably, to a
future concrete injury. See Acorda, 817 F.3d at 762 (“Congress deemed the ANDA filing to
have a non-speculative causal connection to the ANDA filer’s future infliction of real-world
market injury on the patent holder.”).
159 See supra Part III.A.2.
160 If the ANDA is not formally received by the FDA, there is a real risk that the
generic has only sent, in Judge James Gilstrap’s words, “the mere transmission of documents purporting to be an ‘ANDA.’” Allergan, 2014 WL 7336692, at *13.
161 Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 133.
162 Id.
156

1864

The University of Chicago Law Review

[89:7

that receipt is part of the ANDA submission.
Finally, as with the submission of an ANDA, receipt of a document in other areas of law is often necessary to initiate causes
of action or comply with statutory requirements.
Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,163 for example,
venue is usually proper “in the plaintiff’s home district” so long as
“a collection agency had mailed a collection notice to an address
in that district or placed a phone call to a number in that district.”164 Even a notice that is sent to one district and forwarded
to a completely different and completely unintended district may
create venue in the district where final receipt by the plaintiff occurs.165 On the other hand, “if the notice were lost in the mail, it
is unlikely that a violation of the Act would have occurred” in the
first place.166 In other words, the cause of action is created only
upon receipt, and venue can be properly established in the district
where receipt occurs.
Similarly, in the tax context, documents are generally “timely
filed only if they were physically delivered to the IRS by the applicable deadline.”167 Furthermore, though Congress created a
statutory exception to this physical delivery rule for tax documents, even the exception depends on actual physical delivery at
some point.168 “If the document is never delivered at all—say, because it gets lost in the mail—the exception by its terms does not
apply.”169 As a final resort “[t]o protect against a failure of delivery, some taxpayers choose to send documents by registered
163

Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692, 1692a–

1692p).
164

Bates v. C & S Adjusters, Inc., 980 F.2d 865, 867–68 (2d Cir. 1992).
See id. at 868. Of course, venue under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act is
determined by the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, and not the patent venue statute. However, the language interpreted in Bates, 980 F.2d at 868, is largely similar to the
acts of infringement prong from the patent venue statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), the general venue statutory provision at play in Bates, allows a plaintiff to establish venue where
a “substantial part of the events . . . giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(b)(2); see also Bates, 980 F.2d at 868. This is essentially the same inquiry as the
patent venue statute, which asks in part where the defendant “has committed acts of infringement.” 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
166 Bates, 980 F.2d at 868.
167 Baldwin v. United States, 921 F.3d 836, 839–40 (9th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added),
cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 690 (2020).
168 Id. at 840 (“This exception means that a document will be deemed timely filed so
long as two things are true: (1) the document is actually delivered to the IRS, even if after
the deadline; and (2) the document is postmarked on or before the deadline.” (emphasis in
original)).
169 Id.
165
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mail.”170 But even in that case, the registration acts as “prima facie evidence that the document was delivered, and the date of registration will be treated as the postmark date.”171 In other words,
delivery of tax documents to the postal service, along with registration through the registered mail service, constitutes legal
receipt by the IRS.172
These examples parallel what happens when an ANDA applicant submits their ANDA to the FDA. The FDA’s historical
treatment of mailed ANDAs is, in fact, analogous. Though ANDAs
today are generally filed electronically,173 the FDA has historically
used a “date-of-receipt rule” rather than an “alternative mailbox
rule” to govern some priority dates, including those for ANDA
submissions.174 This date-of-receipt rule implies that an ANDA
submission occurs no earlier than the date on which the FDA receives the ANDA. Thus, the FDA’s treatment of ANDA documents
received in Maryland along with analogies to other fields of law
supports the conclusion that receipt of an ANDA is part and parcel of the submission of the ANDA.
B. Centralizing Hatch-Waxman Venue in the District of
Maryland is Justified on Policy Grounds
As demonstrated above, numerous legal arguments support
reading the patent venue statute’s acts of infringement prong to
favor a centralized Hatch-Waxman venue in the District of
Maryland. In addition, there are unique venue policy arguments
that favor the District of Maryland as a centralized HatchWaxman venue. Moreover, the Federal Circuit has expressly
noted policy considerations favoring a centralized HatchWaxman venue.175 Future Hatch-Waxman litigants, invited by
the Federal Circuit to define the “precise contours” of “what all
relevant acts involved in the preparation and submission of an
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Id.
Id.
172 There are similar provisions for electronic tax filings. See Baldwin, 921 F.3d at
841 n.1.
173 See supra note 107.
174 See, e.g., Purepac, 354 F.3d at 889 (upholding the FDA’s use of the date-of-receipt
rule for physically mailed ANDAs).
175 Valeant, 978 F.3d at 1383 (“Valeant does have strong policy reasons for adopting
its reading of the statutes.”).
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ANDA might be,” should come armed with policy arguments to
support their legal reasoning.176
Specialized courts and centralized courts are familiar to patent litigants, as patent law has a variety of patent-specific methods for adjudicating claims.177 The Federal Circuit itself is
perhaps the quintessential example of a specialized patent court;
it has limited and nearly exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent cases.178 Some district courts, too, can have certain judges
specialize in patent cases by “designating” those judges as participants in the Patent Pilot Program.179 There are also a number of
specialized adjudicatory proceedings for patent matters that take
place before administrative patent judges at the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office.180
Additionally, moving toward a centralized district court
venue for Hatch-Waxman litigation could confer known benefits
on Hatch-Waxman litigants. Patent litigation is already concentrated among a relatively small number of district courts—in
some cases because of plaintiff-favorable local rules and in other
cases because of a heavy technology-sector presence such as the
computer industry in Northern California or the pharmaceutical
industry in Delaware or New Jersey.181 Patent litigants, in turn,
are familiar with the benefits of judicial specialization at the district court level in patent matters. For example, the Eastern
District of Virginia exclusively hears appeals from the Patent and
Trademark Office and is praised for its “efficient handling of patent cases” and “bench of judges well-versed in the applicable
176 See id. at 1384 n.8. For a discussion of arguments for and against specialized trial
courts, see Amy Semet, Specialized Trial Courts in Patent Litigation: A Review of the
Patent Pilot Program’s Impact on Appellate Reversal Rates at the Five-Year Mark, 60 B.C.
L. REV. 519, 532–35 (2019).
177 Other areas of federal law have specialized adjudicatory mechanisms, as well, including tax, bankruptcy, and immigration. See Melissa F. Wasserman & Jonathan D.
Slack, Can There Be Too Much Specialization? Specialization in Specialized Courts, 115
NW. UNIV. L. REV. 1405, 1411–15, 1458 (2021).
178 See id. at 1414 n.36.
179 See Semet, supra note 176, at 539–40.
180 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6, 125 Stat. 284, 299–
305 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) (creating the inter partes review proceeding); Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct.
1365, 1379 (2018) (holding that “inter partes review does not violate Article III or the
Seventh Amendment” of the U.S. Constitution); United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct.
1970, 1988 (2021) (holding that the administrative patent judges that preside over inter
partes reviews are inferior officers and therefore the Director of the Patent and Trademark
Office, who is “nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate” must have “discretion to review decisions rendered by [administrative patent judges]”).
181 See Miller, supra note 69, at 767, 781–82 & tbl.1.
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law.”182 The Districts of Delaware and New Jersey handle most
Hatch-Waxman cases,183 and some have suggested that this specialization results in increased judicial efficiency and predictability due to heightened experience among the judges of those
courts.184 And unlike some notoriously pro-plaintiff district courts
with patent-heavy dockets, such as the Eastern District of
Texas,185 the District of Maryland may have specific favorable
qualities as a neutral forum for pharmaceutical patent litigation,
which offers benefits to both plaintiffs and defendants without
unduly favoring either.186 Relatedly, a centralized venue might
also help avoid venue gamesmanship when generic applicants
“seek[ ] to defend patent cases on their home turf or otherwise
seek[ ] a more favorable forum.”187 In sum, moving toward a centralized venue for Hatch-Waxman litigation could have the beneficial result of enabling district court judges to develop special
expertise in neutrally applying Hatch-Waxman’s complicated
rules. And, of course, centralized venue could meaningfully help
avoid the Hatch-Waxman problem of duplicative litigation with
potentially inconsistent results.188
Over two decades ago, in Zeneca, the Federal Circuit did state
that the purpose of Hatch-Waxman was not “to create a national
forum [for Hatch-Waxman litigation] in Maryland,” 189 citing a
broader “policy against the creation of national supercourts in the
District of Columbia.”190 This policy statement is undermined,
however, by the existence of the Federal Circuit itself, which had
appellate jurisdiction over Zeneca only because of its nearexclusive mandate to review patent cases nationwide.191 Indeed,
182 See Alexander Poonai, Note, Hatch-Waxman in the Heartland: Achieving Fair
Venue Reform in Pharmaceutical Litigation, 27 FED. CIR. BAR J. 103, 121 (2017).
183 Miller, supra note 69, at 803–04.
184 See, e.g., Katherine Rhoades, Comment, Do Not Pass Go, Do Not Stop for Summary
Judgment: The U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware’s Seemingly Disjunctive Yet
Efficient Procedures in Hatch-Waxman Litigation, 14 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 81,
98–100 (2016).
185 See Newton, supra note 51, at 267–68.
186 See Poonai, supra note 182, at 121–22 (“The relative neutrality of the area in the
pioneer/generic debate, combined with a plethora of educated, expert witnesses available
to each party, should make the forum acceptable to both parties without offering an advantage to either.”).
187 Newton, supra note 51, at 260 (quotation marks omitted).
188 See supra notes 89–99 and accompanying text.
189 Zeneca, 173 F.3d at 833.
190 Id. at 831.
191 See Wasserman & Slack, supra note 177, at 1414 (noting that the Federal Circuit
has “near-exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals”).
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the Federal Circuit is a national supercourt in the District of
Columbia.192 It is true that the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction is
conferred by statute, but the patent venue rules are also statutory. More concretely, the Federal Circuit’s personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence and venue jurisprudence has shifted dramatically
since Zeneca. For Hatch-Waxman litigants, specific personal jurisdiction has broadened significantly since Zeneca,193 but venue
has proportionately narrowed.194 The limitations on patent venue
established by TC Heartland can cause serious efficiency problems for Hatch-Waxman litigation if plaintiffs cannot successfully
consolidate litigation in a centralized venue before one district
court and one judge. In short, things have changed since Zeneca.
Perhaps for this reason, when the district court in Valeant stated
that acts of infringement that were based on the ANDA submission occurred in the District of Maryland,195 the Federal Circuit
seemed prepared to embrace that reading.196
A generic ANDA applicant might nonetheless argue that a
centralized Hatch-Waxman venue in the District of Maryland is
neither fair nor reasonably convenient. Yet a predictable, neutral
venue would prove fair and reasonably convenient to both parties
because it would avoid the problem of national venue gamesmanship that the patent venue statute was enacted to combat.197
Further, ANDA applicants would clearly be on notice when submitting filings to the FDA that the submission would constitute
an act of infringement in Maryland that could establish venue.
Far from facilitating abuse or gamesmanship, a centralized venue
in Maryland would provide a single, predictable, and potentially
specialized venue option for Hatch-Waxman litigation.
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Cf. id.
Cf. Acorda, 817 F.3d at 762–63.
194 See TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. at 1521.
195 See Valeant, 978 F.3d at 1378 (“[T]he [district] court concluded that the two places
where an act of infringement might have occurred before the filing of the action were West
Virginia and Maryland.”).
196 See id. at 1384 n.8 (“While it may well be that the District of Maryland satisfies
the test for venue that we have laid out here, we do not resolve that question.”).
197 The Federal Circuit has recognized that “Congress adopted the predecessor to
§ 1400(b) . . . to eliminate the ‘abuses engendered’ by previous venue provisions allowing
such suits to be brought in any district in which the defendant could be served.” In re Cray
Inc., 871 F.3d at 1361 (quoting Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 365 U.S. 260, 262
(1961)) (emphasis added). In this sense, centralizing venue in Maryland is a far cry from
the situation repudiated by TC Heartland, where patent plaintiffs could establish venue
nationwide.
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CONCLUSION
Hatch-Waxman litigation presents unique problems for
courts and litigants. The Hatch-Waxman act of patent infringement is “highly artificial”198 and consists of nothing more than
submitting a tightly structured application to a federal regulatory
body. The patent venue statute, too, ties one prong of the venue
inquiry to the act of patent infringement that is being litigated in
the first instance. Hatch-Waxman litigants thus face the confusing scenario where the patent infringement cause of action is tied
to actions taken before an administrative agency, the procedural
rules for venue are tied in part to the act of patent infringement,
and the entire course of litigation is designed to resolve patent
disputes in advance of actual, commercial sales using a statute
crafted specifically for the pharmaceutical industry.
TC Heartland imposed limitations on venue for patent infringement litigants, and those limitations can result in significant judicial inefficiency in the Hatch-Waxman context. In
Valeant, the Federal Circuit resolved some of the complexity associated with Hatch-Waxman venue but created new questions.
In particular, the Federal Circuit concluded that the “plain language of the two statutes at issue” compelled an inflexible reading
of the patent venue statute that precluded a centralized venue in
Hatch-Waxman litigation.199 As this Comment has demonstrated,
however, the same statutes are fairly and readily interpreted to
move toward a centralized Hatch-Waxman venue in the District
of Maryland.
Moving toward a centralized Hatch-Waxman venue would
make the patent venue rules work in unison with HatchWaxman’s substantive provisions, furthering the legislative goal
of achieving a “fine balance between the interests of generic and
pioneer drug companies.”200 Centralizing Hatch-Waxman venue
would help courts. With a centralized Hatch-Waxman venue, district court judges would not need to worry about the possibility of
inconsistent judgments on essentially identical arguments in different districts. Centralizing Hatch-Waxman venue would also
help litigants. Specialization among judges promotes judicial efficiency and predictability; consolidation of duplicative arguments

198
199
200

Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 678 (1990).
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in complex, multi-defendant cases preserves resources; and a centralized venue can clarify the venue inquiry that arises at the
start of litigation. Finally, centralizing Hatch-Waxman venue
would help achieve Hatch-Waxman’s broader goal of efficiently
resolving any patent “infringement dispute . . . before the generic
drug hits the market.”201

201

Id. at 424.

